Russian foreign policy has taken an interesting turn during the administration of President Vladimir Putin. Following the proposed deployment of a strategic ballistic missile defense system in Central Europe, Mr. Putin threatened withdrawal from both the Conventional Forces Europe (CFE) and Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty in addition to retargeting nuclear missiles to Poland and the United States.
Beyond rhetoric, concrete acts of Russian aggression include attempting to claim resource rich elements of the Arctic region, resuming bomber patrols, and invading Georgian airspace culminating in the invasion of Georgia itself. While these seemingly hostile acts are occurring, a great deal of cooperation exists between the United States and Russia in the US-led global war on terrorism. On other fronts, such as relations with the Chinese and Iranian nuclear ambitions, Russian policies seem much more ambivalent and even contradictory What might possibly explain this seemingly contradictory series of policies? Tip O'Neill says, -All politics is (are) local.‖ It is the thesis of this project that Russian foreign policy is best understood through an understanding of Russian domestic politics and the dominant interests that supports Mr. Putin's policies: the military, the oligarchs, the Russian popular nationalist imperative and Putin's political machine itself. This paper will begin with an overview of basic Russian strategic thinking, but will probe more into the construction of Russian ideas and how those ideas have been made manifest within the Russian political system. . WORK UNIT NUMBER
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multipolar counterbalance, but neither Russia and China or any other member of the SCO maintains any real military capability that is a threat to the US. In fact, the issues that have divided Russia and China for generations, racism, raw materials and land, are even more pressing in today's globalized environment.
As far as Iran goes, Russian technology has aided some Iranian reactors but Russia realizes a nucleararmed Islamic state close its borders are clearly not in its interests.
What might possibly explain this seemingly contradictory series of policies? Tip O'Neill says, -All politics is (are) local.‖ 1 It is the thesis of this project that Russian foreign policy is best understood through an understanding of Russian domestic politics and the dominant interests that supports Mr.
Putin's policies: the military, the oligarchs, the Russian popular nationalist imperative and Putin's political machine itself. To be sure, there is a decided amount of realpolitik geo-strategy guiding Russian relations with the United States, the European Union, China, the Central Asian states as well as the Caucus States, and India. This paper will begin with an overview of basic Russian strategic thinking, but will probe more into the construction of Russian ideas and how those ideas have been made manifest within the Russian political system.
PROGNOSTICATIONS
In November 1995, the State Department Political Officer posted in Moscow released an article in the Moscow newspaper Nezavisimaya Gazeta claiming that liberal political reforms in Russian internal politics were finished. 2 This was just before the first modern parliamentary elections in December 1995 when the Russian people voted communist first and ultra-nationalist second; the liberal party took third and fourth place, having split. While there were still hopes among the Western liberal democracies that Russia was experiencing growing pains, Thomas Graham understood that there was a sea change in Russian politics that the Russian state would inextricably move away from liberal democracy toward authoritarianism. As the Russian government proceeded to fall into legislative log-jam, elites that had become empowered during the late Gorbachev and early Yeltsin period began to entwine themselves into the machinery of the state with the whole purpose of extracting rents, for themselves and their limited constituency. Rent seeking involves individuals extracting value from the state without them increasing productivity. Should they continue unabated, rentiers will wear down the efficacy and ultimately the economic stability of the state. 3 Individuals gain and society loses.
As Ambassador Graham notes, the political system that was taking shape in 1995-96 was becoming impenetrable by conventional means, decision-making was increasingly not transparent, and control for property became a deadly endeavor, ultimately because of the powerlessness and irresponsibility of the crucially placed politicians to reign in what he refers to as -t he new elite.‖ By the November before the Duma elections, just one year before the 1996 presidential election that miraculously kept Yeltsin in power, the new elite had de facto control of the political and economic institutions of the state and in addition, these elite felt it had the right to rule. Furthermore, he predicts certain constancy in the nature of the clans as he observes them in 1996. The primary threat to the clans is elections sweeping in overwhelming majorities of the fringes of the Russian polity (ultranationalists and Communists) into the Duma, as it almost did in 1995. Graham pins future success of the clans to maintain power on their ability to create and maintain a political party that would serve as a conduit to the masses, even though the Duma was weakened, the symbolic exercise of poor showings in elections would weaken their regime. Graham believes that no interest group will emerge to challenge any of the Clans. He purports that there is no middle class within sight given the lack of a new class of property owners. Finally, Graham believes that the elites will -c ontrive the election of a figure that suits their collective interests and can regulate competition between them.‖ That, there will be crises between the elites resulting in some disappearing and others gaining entry but largely, the day of reform in Russia began by Mikhail Gorbachev is long since over.
Although he issued the standard disclaimer indicating these views were his own, Yeltsin's administration viewed this article as a qualified insult from the United States. Europe seemed to think that the US was wrongly dismissing Russian opinion and that the US was being impatient with Russian reforms. 8 How well does Dr. Graham's analysis hold up and what relevance does it have for today?
RUSSIAN DOMESTIC POLITICS: YELTSIN TO PUTIN
The 1995 Duma election occurred in the midst of anxiety about the poor results in the Chechnya war. Forty-three groups competed for election but only four crossed the five percent threshold in the party-list vote and none had anything near a majority. The Communist Party (KPRF) (22.7%) had the strongest plurality followed by the Liberal Democratic Party 9 (LDPR) (11.4%) and the 2 liberal parties;
Our Home is Russia (NDR) (10.3%) and Yabloko (7.0%). When the single-mandate seats were added, KPRF emerged with 157 Duma Seats, LDPR with 51, NDR with 55 and Yabloko with 45. This was a total shock as no one had predicted this outcome. The main pre-election poll predicted a Pro-Yeltsin/ProReform coalition would win, but the most oppositional Duma yet gained election. 10 Given the political climate in early 1996, no one gave Boris Yeltsin any significant chance of retaining the Presidency in the December election. Through a stabilization of the situation in Chechnya and the incredible unpopularity of Gennady Zyuganov, Yeltsin won re-election on the premise of providing Russia with stability.
In the early stages of Yeltsin's second administration, the newly emerged oligarchs began to Economics postulates that if the costs of economic transactions are sufficiently low, bargaining among owners will achieve a socially efficient distribution of ownership. 11 At this critical juncture in Russia's economy, Russia lacked both capital and equitable distribution.
Weak Capital Markets and the ensuing August 1998 Crash led to Yeltsin's ultimate demise and the rise of Vladimir Putin. In 1998, uncertainty was so great that 50% of economic transactions were by barter leading to profound inefficiencies. Reality dashed any hope that privatization would create property rights and capital markets. Since the Government needed capital it sold bonds, but it did so just as oil prices collapsed. The government needed to borrow more to meet expenditures so it raised interest rates until August 1998 when the Russian Ruble lost two-thirds of its value against the dollar. The ensuing Since 1999, economic growth has been consistent, however largely driven by the energy sector. 26 Barsukov was replaced by Nikolai Kovalev before being replaced by none other than Vladimir Putin. The FSB as an institution critically affected the evolution of Russian politics. Peter Finn of the Washington Post goes so far to say that the FSB makes all political decisions. 27 Others argue that the FSB uses extra-legal means to intimidate political rivals and generate income. 28 "Answers to questions like why the Soviet Union tried to sneak offensive strategic missiles into Cuba must be affected by basic assumptions we make, categories we use, our angle of vision…But what kind of assumptions do we tend to make? How do these assumptions channel our thinking? What alternative perspectives are available? 31 "
The dominant frame of reference most commonly employed is model I, the rational actor model.
It conceives of states as unitary and purposive where states make consistent, value maximizing choices within specified constraints. This is the traditional method of analyzing foreign policy decision making.
The foundation of this strategy is the assumption that "the conscious calculation of advantages based on an explicit and internally consistent value system‖ 32 motivates state behavior. The basic unit of analysis is governmental action as choice. Events in foreign affairs are actions chosen by the nation. This is the dominant mode of analysis in diplomatic history, strategic studies, and most modes of foreign policy analysis where it is understood that states act to fulfill some goal. Governmental and foreign policy behavior, however, cannot always be understood as action chosen by a unitary, rational decision-maker.
Allison's Model II states that government consists of "a conglomerate of semi-feudal, loosely allied organizations, each with a substantial life of its own. "The name of the game is politics: bargaining along regularized circuits among players positioned hierarchically within the government. Government behavior can thus be understood…not as organizational outputs but as the result s of these bargaining games. In contrast with the rational actor model, the Governmental (or Bureaucratic) Politics Model sees no unitary actor but rather many actors as players-players who focus not on a single strategic issue but on many diverse intra-national problems as well; players who act in terms of no consistent set of strategic objectives but rather according to various conceptions of national, organizational, and personal goals… not by rational choice but by the pulling and hauling that is politics." Player's interests are directly associated with the position occupied and the related -pa rochial priorities and perceptions,‖ this is the reflection of each player's conception of the national interest, the organization's interests, specific programs to which he or she is committed and personal interests.
Relative influence is directly associated with the degree of power a particular position has. Finally, action channels determine the rules. Action channels are -regularized means of taking governmental action on a specific kind of issue 36 .‖
Allison illustrates Model III with the Kennedy Administration's decision to blockade Cuba rather than 1) doing nothing or 2) employing force. Initially the president and most of his advisors wanted a clean, surgical air strike. By the end of the week, opinions in Kennedy's advising corps had shifted.
Secretary of Defense McNamara was convinced a strike would lead to nuclear war. He chose the blockade as a fallback. When the Secretary of Defense -whose department had the action, whose reputation in the cabinet was unequaled, in whom the president demonstrated full confidence-marshaled the arguments for the blockade and refused to be moved, the blockade became a formidable alternative.
Model III is Allison's unique contribution. Many analyses use bureaucratic politics to explain fruitfully a series of foreign policy events. 37 In summary, one can derive four propositions from Model III.
First, player preferences will correlate highly with bureaucratic positions. Second, player perceptions correlate highly with bureaucratic position. Third, a player's influence in a decision-making process flows from his or her bureaucratic position and finally, a decision making process is a bargaining situation in which players promote their organizational interests, with the result being that governmental decisions do not reflect the intentions of any particular player. Allison's work is invaluable for highlighting the manner in which domestic political forces drive foreign policy.
AN ANALYSIS
A Model I analysis of Russia would consider the possible goals that the US and Russia are pursuing and attribute rational behavior to these goals. For instance, a typical reaction from the US is that
Russia has been willfully interfering with US goals of security because it is now a revisionist power that seeks to once again contest US power in the international system. From this perspective, NATO expansion is primarily about increasing US power. Russia where it will begin to cycle downward. The longer oil prices stay below $70 a barrel (this morning it was $64), the greater the damage to its capital reserves. The Russian Stock Market is off 60% from a year ago, most of this being from the capital flight following the military action in early August. Diplomatically, Russia is effectively isolated. Now, however, is the time to act. Russia's foreign policy will consist primarily of cheap talk, the -m ilitary exercises‖ with Venezuela are not problematic in the long-term. Mr.
Gates is correct, the Russian military establishment is still far off from challenging the US. The question we should be asking ourselves is, -wha t direction do we want to push Russia in?‖ One thing is for certain, an isolated Russia gives rise to the elements we do not want to see. There are two elements in the Duma that we would greatly prefer not to see over United Russia, the Communists, and the Ultra-nationalists.
We should be careful that Russia is not weakened too much. Again, in grand strategic terms, what future do we want? I believe that a weak Russia would end up under Chinese influence. Rather a Russia integrated into Europe on its terms gives Europe a supply of energy and US security a bulwark against a
Chinese revival and Islamic-Fascism from the Middle East and Central Asia.
The question then becomes then how could we persuade Russia? Russia will require western technology for gas and oil extraction after 2011. In addition, the economic elite are facing a disruption of finance, the free flow of finances necessary for economic stability. We need a new basis for US-Russian cooperation. One NATO potentially could provide. NATO can guarantee that Russia's western border is stable and non-threatening. Until you get to Japan, Russia's southern and eastern border has no such potential.
Russia is a riddle in an enigma. All countries usually are, but Churchill sounded particularly profound because when he said this Russia was threatening international stability. The incoming Obama administration will encourage democratic reforms but insist on the observation of territorial sovereignty for former states. Yet, there is not a plan that would guide the current confrontation with Russia over the future of Eurasia that makes the world more secure. The current approach to punish the aggressive Russia but work in vital areas of common interest probably is not sustainable. What is there to do then? The
United States used to generate a great deal of sympathy from average Russians during the Cold War.
During the Soviet era, millions of Russians heard broadcasts from the United States and free Europe. This represented a quiet dissidence with the ruling elite and a recognition that of the moral authority of the west. 43 After the lengthy experience with terror and repression with the resulting fear and exhaustion, there was an ingrown resentment to the aging Communist Party elite and their legacy of lines, shortages and deprivations of individual freedoms. For a large part of Russian society, there was an unspoken desire to defeat communism. There was a natural symbiosis between the Russian people and the US, albeit implicit and under a nuclear shadow. Today, the US no longer has a sympathetic constituency in Russia that perceives the United States as a force for good that could make the Russian people freer, more democratic or more prosperous. Even the liberal intelligentsia, once a bulwark of US sympathy, now is split regarding their view of the US. The long term solution is to recapture this moral authority, slowly but definitively, we must build relations with the Russian people and most particularly with the interests that dominate Russia.
